

## PERFORMANCE MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD COUNTERDRUG PROGRAM

BY

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**PERFORMANCE MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD  
COUNTERDRUG PROGRAM**

by

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## **ABSTRACT**

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The National Guard Counter Drug Program (NGCDP) must develop new performance measures of effectiveness and request modification to the current counter drug reporting chain to better assess their ability in supporting the war on drugs. The President of the United States declared a war on drugs and determined illicit drug use, drug manufacturing and drug trafficking as a threat to our national interest. The NGCDP is a way to leverage unique military capabilities and provide manpower, technology, equipment and facility support to law enforcement agencies and civilian based organizations. The NGCDP supports numerous stakeholders in the war on drugs, each with their own requirements for success. The current reporting chain and measures of performance used by NGCDP do not provide the resolution necessary for accurate assessments. To assist in achieving unified action with all supported counter drug agencies, NGCDP should take the lead in requesting changes to the reporting chain and developing new performance measures of effectiveness. These changes should include a return on investment performance measure focused on the desired effects of each supported stakeholder.





## PERFORMANCE MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD COUNTERDRUG PROGRAM

Illegal drug use threatens everything that is good about our country. It can break the bonds between parents and children. It can turn productive citizens into addicts, and it can transform schools into places of violence and chaos. Internationally, it finances the work of terrorists who use drug profits to fund their murderous work. Our fight against illegal drug use is a fight for our children's future, for struggling democracies, and against terrorism.<sup>1</sup>

—President George W. Bush

Illicit drugs kill more than 21,000 Americans each year and result in a loss of \$160 billion dollars in revenue.<sup>2</sup> More Americans die each year in drug related deaths than have died in all terrorist attacks over the past decade. To combat this atrocity, America is waging a war on drugs. In the 2008 National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS), President Bush stated that youth drug use declined 24% over the past five years equating to 860,000 fewer young people using drugs. Access to addict recovery programs expanded to reach an additional 190,000 Americans. Seizure of unprecedented amounts of illegal drugs and drug money seriously disrupted drug trafficking. The market disruption caused illicit drug prices to increase over 50% with a drop in drug purity of over 15%.<sup>3</sup> While these results show positive effects in the fight against illicit drugs, there is more to accomplish. Constant assessment is required to keep policies and programs viable in the future. Developing accurate assessment tools is critical to accomplishing this mission.

The National Guard plays a small yet very important role in America's war on drugs. The National Guard possesses the unique ability to leverage personnel, training and equipment to enhance other agencies' capabilities in combating drugs. The purpose of this paper is to explain the necessity of refining the current reporting chain

and developing effective measures of performance for the National Guard's support of the war on drugs. To accomplish this purpose, this paper will first explain why the war on drugs is a national interest and then provide an overview into the background and current national strategies. Second, it will differentiate the various stakeholders supported by the National Guard. Third, it will describe deficiencies in the current reporting chain and assessment process. Finally, it will convey the importance of effective measures of performance and identify suggested methods of improvement in the road ahead.

### National Interest

In the 2008 NDCS, President George W. Bush reiterated that the fight against drugs is a national interest by stating that drug control in America is "a great moral imperative: we must reduce illegal drug use because, over time, drugs rob men, women, and children of their dignity and of their character."<sup>4</sup> In an effort to control drugs, the President focused the initial 2002 NDCS upon three National Priorities: stop drug use before it starts, intervene and heal America's drug users, and disrupt the market for illegal drugs.<sup>5</sup>

The Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) articulated the President's guidance against the use of illicit drugs in their Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2007 to 2012. They stated that it is important to fight drug criminals and narco-terrorists at all levels viewing illegal drugs as both a threat to the United States and a transnational crime. Their strategic plan further defined the illegal drug market as a threat since it impedes legitimate economic activity, threatens public order, undermines the rule of law and citizens' confidence in government, diverts

resources, and finances terrorist activities.<sup>6</sup> In relationship to countering the flow of drugs into the United States, their strategy states, “We will continue to fight the production, transportation, and sale of illegal narcotics...reduce the flow of illegal drugs to the United States.”<sup>7</sup> The State Department’s priorities are to establish alternative livelihoods for illegal growers; focus on eradication and interdiction activities, build the will and capacity abroad to arrest, prosecute, and punish traffickers; and assist partner countries to prevent drug use.<sup>8</sup>

Current and past presidents agree that the proliferation of the illicit drug market is clearly a national interest. It threatens our moral fabric as well as our security from terrorists and criminals operating from outside our borders. The seriousness of this threat is the reason for military involvement in the war on drugs.

### Background

In December 1981, Congress realized the need to help law enforcement agencies by providing manpower and equipment with the intent to interdict the flow of drugs into the United States. The outcome of this realization was the Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement statute found in Title 10 USC 371-380.<sup>9</sup> Although this statute primarily focused the use of Department of Defense (DoD) assets outside of the United States, it signaled congressional interest in the growing drug culture and was the beginning of the military’s role in counterdrug operations.<sup>10</sup>

In 1986, President Ronald Reagan declared militant policies in the war on drugs in an effort to fight for drug-free schools and workplaces, expand drug treatment, and provide stronger law enforcement and drug interdiction efforts.<sup>11</sup> Soon afterwards, the U.S. Congress authorized the National Guard the ability to perform interdiction and anti-

drug activities. According to Title 32, US Code, the Governor of each state may receive funds for “the purpose of carrying out drug interdiction and counter-drug activities.”<sup>12</sup> The soldiers placed on full-time counter-drug orders by their respective state are not restricted by the Posse Comitatus Act and therefore, can enforce the law as directed by state authorities.<sup>13</sup>

In February of 2002, President George W. Bush implemented the first national strategy countering illegal drug use. In the introductory letter of the NDCS, he stated, “This strategy represents the first step in the return of the fight against drugs to the center of our national agenda.”<sup>14</sup> For six years, the strategy against illicit drugs remained constant, and then in 2008 President Bush published a new NDCS.

### Current Strategy

The 2008 NDCS remained very similar in focus and priorities in comparison with the initial 2002 strategy. The most significant change in the current policy is the focus on illegal drug trade as a means to finance terrorism. As the United States continues to lead the global war on terror, the link between terrorists and drugs is more visible. Enormous cash and asset profits from selling illegal drugs assist in financing rogue states and international terrorist organizations determined to threaten the United States.<sup>15</sup> From the White House, both the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) include concerns and potential threats stemming from drug trafficking in relationship with terrorism.

The NSS emphasizes drugs three times, once as a challenge of globalization,<sup>16</sup> once as an irregular challenge by state and non-state actors as a way to counter traditional military advantages<sup>17</sup> and finally as a regional threat of Marxist terrorists in

our democratic ally of Columbia.<sup>18</sup> The NDS highlights countering drugs as part of our strategy of promoting security. The strategy explains that rogue states and extremist groups often use trafficking of persons, drug-running and illicit arms trade as a way to exploit instability and promote regional conflict.<sup>19</sup>

The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support also understands the necessity of countering drugs. The Homeland Defense strategy encompasses the DoD as part of the active, layered defense of our nation. The strategy includes DoD support to civilian law enforcement and counterterrorism authorities relative to countering illegal drug trafficking consistent with U.S. law. DoD also supports the Department of Justice and domestic law enforcement by providing expertise, intelligence, equipment, training and facilities when so directed.<sup>20</sup> As will be shown, the counterdrug mission of the National Guard mirrors the support requirements given to DoD.

In order to remain current with the policy shift on drugs in relation to drugs and terrorism, the 2008 NDCS nested several key priorities focused at complementing the NSS and NDS. Four of the crucial priorities are:

- Focus U.S. action in areas where the illicit drug trade has converged or may converge with other transnational threats with severe implications for U.S. national security.<sup>21</sup>
- Deny drug traffickers, narco-terrorists and their criminal associates illicit profits and deny access to the U.S. and international banking systems.<sup>22</sup>
- Strengthen U.S. capabilities to identify and target the links between drug trafficking and other national security threats and anticipate future drug related national security threats.<sup>23</sup>

- Disrupt the flow of drugs to the United States and through other strategic areas by building new and stronger bilateral and multilateral partnerships.<sup>24</sup>

Congressional commitment for continuing the fight against drugs is reflected in the FY09 budget with a proposed 1.33 billion dollars earmarked to the DoD. United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) receives just over a billion dollars of the budget to combat the spread of drugs into the country from outside of our borders. Specific examples of USSOUTHCOM's efforts include partnership with the government of Columbia in waging a unified campaign against production and trafficking of illegal drugs and by assisting the Colombian government seize the initiative against illegal paramilitaries and narco-terrorists.<sup>25</sup> Another example is Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B) which organizes training exercises, counterdrug activities, disaster relief and humanitarian operations in Central America.<sup>26</sup> A final example is the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S) that integrates and synchronizes interagency counterdrug operations and is responsible for the detection and monitoring of suspect air and maritime drug activity in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico.<sup>27</sup> These are just three of many examples that the active arm of the military conducts aimed at stopping the flow of drugs into our country.

The National Guard receives the remaining \$280 million of the proposed FY09 budget to assist state, county, city and tribal law enforcement fight against drugs through the National Guard Counterdrug Program (NGCDP). The specified mission of the NGCDP is to "leverage unique military capabilities of community based Guardsmen while advancing technologies and specialized equipment in the support of Law

Enforcement Agency (LEA) and Civilian Based Organization (CBO) efforts to counter domestic illicit drug activity and transnational threats against our homeland.”<sup>28</sup>

#### National Guard Counterdrug Program

With the formation of the NGCDP in 1989, the National Guard began a unique role supporting the fight against drugs. Currently, the NGCDP employs approximately 2,600 soldiers and airmen with skills in foreign languages, criminal analysis, map-making, communications and engineering.<sup>29</sup> Soldiers and airmen also assist in marijuana eradication, ground and air transportation, cargo inspections, surface and air reconnaissance as well as training and instruction to law enforcement agencies and civilians. According to NGCDP’s capabilities briefing, counterdrug personnel assisted law enforcement agencies seize an estimated \$28 billion dollars worth of drugs and related assets off American streets in 2008.<sup>30</sup> With roots in Hometown, USA, the National Guard can greatly assist in stopping illicit drug use, manufacture, importation and distribution within our borders.

The best way to describe the National Guard’s strategy in the war on drugs, is through use of the U. S. Army War College’s “three-legged stool concept of ends, ways and means.”<sup>31</sup> The “ends” are to support the elimination of illicit drugs inside of the United States. The “ways” to accomplish this are to reduce the demand for illicit drugs, stop the growth and manufacture of these drugs and prevent the importation and distribution of these drugs from other countries across our borders and throughout our cities and towns. The current “means” that NGCDP has available include the Drug Demand Reduction (DDR) Program, the Joint Substance Abuse Prevention Program (JSAPP), and domestic cannabis suppression. Additional “means” available through

NGCDP include providing support to various federal, state, city and tribal law enforcement agencies in criminal analysis, linguist translation, aviation reconnaissance and transportation, ground transportation, engineering and communications.

With this strategy in mind, the NGCDP developed the vision to be “the premier military entity enhancing interagency operational synergy and cooperation at federal, state, tribal and local levels across fifty-four states, district and territories.”<sup>32</sup> There are numerous defined and inherent tasks for any organization desiring to be a premier entity. One of the key requirements to accomplishing this vision is to be able to prove it. The ability to define and measure performance through an accurate reporting chain is critical, especially when resources are in high demand. Unfortunately, NGCDP’s current reporting chain and performance results do not provide an effective measurement to their stakeholders and to the budget controllers.

### Stakeholders

Although this paper focuses on the role of the National Guard, it is important to note that the military is not the lead agency in the war on drugs. While DoD and subsequently the National Guard are significant players, they are in a supporting role. After viewing our national interest, strategy and multiple policies regarding the fight against drugs, it is critical to understand the various stakeholders and their relationship with the National Guard’s program. The following is a breakdown of the different stakeholders and their expectations of the NGCDP:

*Congress.* Conduct drug supply and demand reduction activities at the state and local level by supporting local organizations in their interdiction and demand reduction efforts.<sup>33</sup>



*Office of the National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP).* Use the NDCS as a guide to stop drug use before it starts. Intervene, heal America's drug users and disrupt the market for illegal drugs.<sup>34</sup>

*Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics (DASD-CN).* Utilize the unique capabilities and assets of the National Guard criminal analysts to facilitate the information flow between DoD and LEAs specifically to support domestic counterdrug and counter narco-terrorism efforts.<sup>35</sup>

*Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (DASD-HD).* Provide counterdrug equipment, personnel, training and facilities to civilian authorities as requested.<sup>36</sup>

*Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB).* Provide advice to the CNGB on all counterdrug activities and coordinate planning efforts throughout the National Guard. Provide national strategies, policies, fiscal oversight and program management for all individual state counterdrug activities.<sup>37</sup>

*Governors and Adjutant Generals.* Provide resources and strategies for state leadership in support and execution of Title 32 counterdrug activities. Provide and maintain performance measures to inform and influence representatives of federal and state governments toward the sustainment and improvement of counterdrug programs.<sup>38</sup>

*Law Enforcement, Security Agencies and Community Based Organizations.* Provide the unique capabilities of the National Guard to support state, city, local and tribal organizations directly involved in reducing the supply and demand for illicit drugs.<sup>39</sup>

Like any agency that supports multiple stakeholders, the National Guard has a tremendous task in reporting measures of effectiveness. The measurement must be identified and understood by stakeholders in relationship with their own mission and budget. Since all of the supported agencies are government funded, each has a limited budget with fiscal accountability. Each stakeholder is looking for the most effective result per dollar spent.

### Need for Effective Measurements

Because the war on drugs has numerous stakeholders and participants it is critical to establish effective measurements and unified action between each supported and supporting agency. Every stakeholder and participating agency must understand their own role in combating illicit drugs. Possibly even more important is the ability of each stakeholder to understand the requirements and capabilities of other agencies. A unified action provides the process for the agencies to collaborate and leverage resources. Without unified action, two distinct problems may arise. The first is a possible lack of coverage in a critical portion of the overall strategy causing an exploitable seam used by criminals and narco-terrorists. The second, and far more common, is a duplication of effort. Some duplication such as intelligence gathering may be acceptable; however, duplication usually is a waste of resources.

The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) produced a list of key practices that help sustain collaboration among federal agencies. This list of key principles is applicable to non-federal agencies as well as the federal agencies:

- Define and articulate a common outcome.
- Identify and address needs by leveraging resources.

- Develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report the results of collaborative efforts.<sup>40</sup>

The National Guard accomplished the first key practice with the publication of the counterdrug program's vision and mission statement. Both of these statements define and articulate the desired outcome of the National Guard to provide synergistic support in the war on drugs. These goals do not contradict any stated outcomes from the chain of command. In fact, the NGCDP's vision and mission nest very effectively through all strategies and policies back to the President's NSS, NDS and NDCS. The current stakeholders should also have their own vision and mission statements with a common outcome nesting back to the White House strategies and policies.

To meet the second key practice, the NGCDP demonstrates an exceptional ability to present stakeholders the capabilities within the National Guard. NGCDP demonstrates their supporting role to stakeholders first by identifying the other agencies' needs and then second by leveraging National Guard resources to fill their requirements.

The National Guard's linguistic capabilities are one of the finest examples of providing unique resources in the supporting role to other stakeholders. National Guard soldiers placed on long-term orders have the explicit task of translating foreign documents and tapes. The work completed by these soldiers directly results in useable intelligence for multiple law enforcement agencies. This capability strengthens the parallel criminal analysis and information dissemination network facilitating the flow of relevant information to communities of interest outside of the National Guard.<sup>41</sup>

Title 32 requires Guardsmen to remain in a deployable status during their full time orders by stating, “National Guard personnel will not degrade their military skills as a result of performing these activities.”<sup>42</sup> For National Guard linguists, the translation and intelligence analysis programs are a perfect fit. They can provide a unique capability to stakeholders while improving their military skills for potential deployments.

The third key practice required for unified action is developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report the results of a program’s action. One of the challenges in having multiple stakeholders is the reporting chain. Stakeholders require information from NGCDP specifically dependent on the focus of their organizations.

### Reporting Chain

Figure 1<sup>43</sup> depicts the current mandated reporting chain used by the current White House administration.




Figure 1 – NGCDP Reporting Chain

The chain begins with each individual state counterdrug program reporting their raw data to NGCDP through the Counterdrug Management Information System (CMIS). This information is forwarded to DASD-CN where it is reformatted and sent to ONDCP in a classified report. ONDCP, within the Executive Office of the White House, compiles data from all the reporting counterdrug agencies in the country and compiles a report broken down with their nine functional areas over a three-year cycle. The initial data sent by each individual state is a small portion of the final ONDCP report.

The second part of the reporting chain directly correlates with the budget and program funding. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which is also within the Executive Office of the White House, uses the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) to determine continual funding of a project. The White House shares the PART assessments with Congress thus adding transparency to the budget and policy formulation process. Since Congress originally provided each Governor with the ability to use Title 32 soldiers for counterdrug activities, Congress can also request reports from the Governors and Adjutant Generals of each state.

The White House, OMB and ONDCP each have direct influence on DASD-CN, which in turn controls the budget for NGCDP. Congress also influences NGCDP by concurring with or overriding the Executive Office's budget plan to fund or not fund the counterdrug programs.

With regard to the third key principle of developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report the results, the verdict is mixed. The monitoring and reporting system is complete; however, due to segregated reporting chains, there is very little unity of effort in reporting. This paper only displays the reporting chain for the NGCDP

and other DoD organizations. Each agency with a part in the war on drugs uses their own reporting chain. These reporting mechanisms follow a stove-piped chain of command that is not consolidated until they reach ONDCP. To achieve unified action, each agency should report or at least courtesy copy laterally to supported and supporting agencies.

### Current Measures

As stated earlier, ONDCP receives classified reports from all agencies countering drugs in the United States including DoD organizations through DASD-CN. For ONDCP to conduct their assessment, they use many different project codes with associated goals. DASD-CN uses two of these project codes to measure the success of NGCDP. The two general project codes with associated ONDCPs goals are:

- Increase the capability/capacity of US and partner nation forces so they are capable of conducting/sustaining operations against narcotics trafficking and international terrorist organizations and other transnational threats related to the drug trade.<sup>44</sup>
- Provide intelligence and technology support to US and partner nation forces designed to dismantle narcotics trafficking and international terrorist organizations benefiting from drug trade.<sup>45</sup>

The next portion of this paper shows the difference between the goals above portrayed by ONDCP and performance measures in Table 1<sup>46</sup> below reported by NGCDP. Comparison between both is evidence of poor linkage in the reporting system.

Counterdrug Program Task	Measure of Performance	Performance Result
Technical Support	No measure recorded	
Intelligence	Number of pages translated	102,230
	Number of minutes translated	100,440
	Number of tapes translated	8,644
	Number of cases analyzed	137,756
	Number of database Updates	1,910,169
	Number of driver license checks	155,098
	Number of deconflictions	25,860
	Number of pen registers	58,342
	Number of telephone tolls	15,860,082
Communications	New of communication stations	42
Infrastructure	Engineering projects completed	8
	Abandoned structures boarded up	449
	Abandoned structures razed	90
	Fence-rail/barrier-rail used (linear feet)	19,536
	Road cut and rock fill (in cubic yards)	28,591
General support to LEAs	No recorded measure	
Transportation	Number of ground missions	33
	Aviation transportation missions	6
	Number of aviation CD missions	9,970
	Number of aviation hours	29,522
Training	Number of personnel trained	110,812
	Number of training hours	2,344,413

Table 1 - 2007 National Guard Counterdrug Mid-Year Performance Results

In viewing Table 1, it is obvious that the NGCDP accomplishes numerous activities during the year; however, it is difficult to discern the linkage between their activities and goals stated by ONDCP. NGCDP uses data such as hours, feet, yards, pounds and events to measure their performance, while ONDCP measures capabilities and capacity to accomplish the mission. Raw numbers, as provided by NGCDP is useful for accountability, but it does not quantify the ability to achieve the desired effects of the supported goals.

The format that DASD-CN is required to follow further complicates reporting measurements to ONDCP. DASD-CN converts the raw data provided by NGCDP into a very ambiguous measure called a level of effort assessment. A measure of effectiveness and a level of effort are not the same thing. Some argue that raw numbers are a measure of effectiveness; for example, a ten percent increase in the number of translated pages each year equate to more effectiveness each year. Unfortunately, unless the only goal is to translate pages, this is a bad measure of effectiveness. A more accurate way to portray effectiveness in this example is that the ten percent of additional pages directly correlate to a specified increase in drug related arrests.

Raw numbers are also dangerous because they do not always provide a correlation to the return on investment (ROI). The ten percent increase in translated pages may be due to a fifty percent increase in translators, therefore equating to more money invested with little return. In a time of limited budgets and increased expectations, effectiveness and efficiency are critical to maximizing ROI.



### Program Assessment Rating Tool

The importance of assessing a government program is one of the greatest priorities and challenges of the White House and Congress. Beginning in President George W. Bush's first term, the White House developed the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). The purpose of the PART review is first, to identify the strengths and weaknesses of specific federal programs, and second, to assist in forming management decisions aimed at making the program more effective. OMB uses the ratings compiled by PART as a means to determine the program's future budget. Currently PART rates programs "to provide you information about where we're successful and where we fall short, and in both situations, what we're doing to improve our performance next year."<sup>47</sup>

The PART review rates program performance in purpose and design, strategic planning, program management and program results and accountability.<sup>48</sup> Proponents of the current PART process believe that since PART includes a consistent series of analytical questions, it allows programs to show improvements over time, and allows comparisons between similar programs.<sup>49</sup> PART ratings for each reviewed program include effective, moderately effective, adequate, ineffective and results not demonstrated.<sup>50</sup>

Currently NGCDP is not one of the military programs within DoD directly evaluated by PART. ONDCP however is fully vested with five programs under PART review. These five programs include counterdrug research & development, counterdrug technology transfer, drug-free communities support, high intensity drug trafficking and the youth anti-drug media campaign.<sup>51</sup> Of the five reviewed programs, only the drug-free communities support program and the high intensity drug trafficking areas program are

currently rated “adequate” by PART. The other three programs are presently receiving a rating of “results not demonstrated”.<sup>52</sup> It is feasible for NGCDP to use the PART evaluation criteria to better align their program with ONDCP, a major stakeholder.

As White House administrations change, PART will probably undergo some severe revisions. During his campaign for the presidency, Barack Obama promised to “fundamentally reconfigure PART, arguing that it is insular, arbitrary and used to promote ideological goals rather than true performance measures.”<sup>53</sup> He also stated a need for new performance goals that are “based on congressional intent and feedback from the people served by government programs.”<sup>54</sup> Those looking to change PART believe that many of the questions asked by PART are subjective and very difficult to quantify.

Since PART is directly linked to OMB and dollar resources, a ROI focused approach to assessing programs may become critical to continued funding. The National Guard must take a proactive approach in developing new performance measures of effectiveness for the NGCDP. In order to continue receiving the required funding or to receive additional funds, these performance measures must tell a comprehensive story of the ends, ways and means of the entire NGCDP strategy.

### Performance Measures of Effectiveness

The ability to provide assessment is critical in measuring the effectiveness of a unified action. The Joint Warfighting Center states that providing assessment “helps stakeholders determine progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective. It helps identify opportunities and any need for course corrections.”<sup>55</sup> Measures of assessment are further broken down into two types:

Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) and Measures of Performance (MOP). More specifically, MOEs are associated with creating effects by answering the question, “are we doing the right things?” while MOPs are associated with task accomplishment by answering question, “are we doing things right?”<sup>56</sup>

To understand the difference between MOPs and MOEs, consider the NGCDP’s Drug Demand Reduction (DDR) program. One of the goals of this program is to reduce substance abuse among youth. A MOP would assess the numbers of youth participating in the DDR program while a MOE would assess the effectiveness the program has in reducing the number of youth abusing drugs. It is easy to see why both measures are required to provide an accurate assessment and unified action for stopping drug abuse. For the purpose of this paper, the use of the term Performance Measures of Effectiveness (PME) describes a best effort in combining both MOPs and MOEs.

### Return on Investment

One of the biggest difficulties in assessing the war on drugs is that the overall results are often measured with a negative correlation, meaning assessments are looking at how many times something does not happen rather than how many times something does happen. We find examples of negative correlation measurements throughout counterdrug programs including the President’s national strategy against drugs. Addressing his three pillars of success, the President states successful results in the current drug policy by way of negative correlation measurements. The NDCS measures a decline in youth drug use, a decline in individuals becoming addicts and a decline in drugs on American streets.<sup>57</sup> While each of these items represent success in

the program, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of a program with measurements quantifying how many times something does not happen.

In an effort to tie success into the budgetary process, some federal counterdrug programs that use PART have also developed their own ROI measurements. The Washington/Baltimore High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) published their performance results using a ROI focus in relation to their annual budget as shown in Table 2.<sup>58</sup>

Year	Annual Budget to Counter Drug	Drugs & Assets Removed from Market	ROI ( \$ removed / \$ spent)
2004	\$6,292,325	\$73,747,591	\$11.72
2005	\$6,021,379	\$70,080,306	\$11.63
2006	\$5,965,998	\$62,215,482	\$10.42
2007	\$6,082,169	\$74,422,986	\$12.23

Table 2 – Washington/Baltimore HIDTA Return on Investment

The Washington/Baltimore HIDTA uses the correlation of their annual budget and the dollar amount of illicit drugs and assets removed from the market to define a ROI. Based on this table, they effectively removed nearly twelve dollars worth of illicit drugs and assets from the Washington and Baltimore markets for every dollar spent from their budget on that task. Determining the ROI is a good step towards developing PME's but it only displays the science of accounting and not the art of effectiveness. For a complete PME, the agency must understand the effect of the drugs removed from the market. They must take their assessment one-step further and ask if their programs stopped individuals from using drugs or did they just force production of more drugs?

### Recommendation

The National Guard needs to develop new PME's that include a ROI focused on the desired effects of the supported stakeholders in order to achieve a unified action in countering drugs. Since the National Guard plays a supporting role in the war on drugs, the proposed PME's need consensus by both NGCDP and each stakeholder. As shown earlier in Table 1, NGCDP currently uses hard numbers of items and events to quantify their performance results. These measurements serve to quantify where dollars are spent and man-hours used but they do not assess effectiveness or ROI.

The first step to developing new PME's is to request modification to the reporting chain. NGCDP needs visualization of each supported stakeholders desired effects in correlation with their actions. This step will also assist in verifying that there is no duplication of effort between programs.

The second step is to determine the total costs of each program. The total of these costs include pay & allowances, equipment use & repair parts, supplies and facilities.

The third step is to determine the ROI. As a supporting agency, NGCDP does not receive a monetary return for money spent, but supported agencies can determine actual monetary savings. The stakeholder and NGCDP can calculate a ROI by determining how much each supported agency saves or is able to accomplish due to the direct support of NGCDP. A comparison between the cost savings provided by NGCDP versus costs the stakeholder would require without NGCDP support becomes a ROI. This measure of performance provides the ability to ascertain the criticality of NGCDP support but it still does not prove effectiveness.

Finally, the fourth step is to assess the effectiveness of the support to the stakeholder's program. This subjective analysis must determine if the support given by NGCDP meets the goals and objectives of the task required by each stakeholder. Unified action is only achieved when the stakeholders' ends are accomplished due to the effectiveness of the supporting agency.

This recommendation looks simple on paper but the numerous stakeholders and varied amounts of support make it a difficult proposition. Unfortunately, with limited budgets and continued criminal drug activity, it is essential to develop new PMEs enhancing the National Guard's role in the war on drugs.

### Conclusion

The President of the United States declared a war on drugs and determined illicit drug use, drug manufacturing and drug trafficking as a threat to our national interest. Beginning in 1981, Congress provided laws that allow military cooperation with civilian law enforcement. Within the military, the National Guard is the primary supporter of civilian law enforcement within the borders of the United States. The National Guard developed a counter drug program as a way to leverage their unique military capabilities and provide manpower, technology, equipment and facility support to law enforcement agencies and civilian based organizations.

The NGCDP supports numerous stakeholders in the war on drugs, each with their own requirements for success. According to a GAO report, defining common goals, leveraging resources and presenting accurate assessments are critical to providing effective support and unified action between multiple agencies. The current reporting chain and measures of performance used by NGCDP do not provide the resolution

necessary for accurate assessments. The current reporting chain is stove-piped within agencies and therefore NGCDP is unable to visualize the effects of their support to the supported stakeholders. NGCDP's performance measures are composed of raw data that lacks the ability to measure effectiveness.

Although the National Guard is a supporting agency, NGCDP can take the lead in requesting changes to the reporting chain and developing new performance measures of effectiveness. Additional transparency by reporting laterally will enhance the ability for NGCDP to understand the goals and objectives of each supporting agency. Development of new PMEs based on a ROI focused on the desired effects of the supported stakeholders allows for improved assessment accuracy and a unified action in the war on drugs.

## Endnotes

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Bush, *National Drug Control Strategy 2002*, 4.

<sup>6</sup> Condoleezza Rice and Henrietta H. Fore, *Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2007-2012 – Transformational Diplomacy*, (Washington DC: U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, May 2007), 15.

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Domestic Support Operations*, Army Regulation FM 100-19 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, July 1993), 3-2.

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<sup>15</sup> James G. Stavridis, "What Ever Happened to the War on Drugs?" *Joint Force Quarterly*, 51, (4th Quarter, 2008), 110.

<sup>16</sup> George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy* (Washington DC: The White House, March 2006), 47.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*, 44.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid*, 15.

<sup>19</sup> George W. Bush, *National Defense Strategy* (Washington DC: The White House, June 2008), 9.

<sup>20</sup> Gordon England, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, June 2005), 12.

<sup>21</sup> Bush, *National Drug Control Strategy 2008*, 34.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>25</sup> Donald Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, February, 2006), 14.

<sup>26</sup> James G. Stavridis, *United States Southern Command - Command Strategy 2018*, (Miami, FL: USSOUTHCOM, June 2008), 17.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>28</sup> William S. Carle, *Counterdrug Division CONOPS & Support Plans FY09-FY13*, (Arlington, VA: The National Guard Bureau, October 2008), 17.



<sup>29</sup> Ibid, 5.

<sup>30</sup> William S. Carle, “NGB-J3 Counterdrug Division Capabilities Briefing”, briefing slides with scripted commentary, Arlington VA, October 20, 2008, 25.

<sup>31</sup> “Course Overview,” in *Theory of War and Strategy – Course Directive*, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2009), 2-3.

<sup>32</sup> Carle, Counterdrug Division CONOPS & Support Plans FY09-FY13, 17.

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<sup>34</sup> Bush, *National Drug Control Strategy 2008*, 4.

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> United States Government Accountability Office, *Results Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration Among Federal Agencies* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, October 2005), 10.

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<sup>44</sup> Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counter Narcotics, *FY 2007 Annual Report*, (Washington DC: DASD-CN, April 2008), Project codes extracted and given to author by Theodore Plucinski, October 2008.

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<sup>53</sup> Robert Brodsky, "Great Expectations," *Government Executive*, (October 2008), 24.

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